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Response to Reviewers’ Comments 
 
on 
 
Wittgenstein, Moorean absurdity and its disappearance from speech 
 
Synthese MS SYNT188 
 
Reviewer #1  
 
In the Crimmins example, the temporality in the treatment seems wrong: Lois doesn't 
lose her belief about Clark being idiotic when he's not present. 
 
Author’s Response  
 
I don’t think I was committed in the original MS to the claim that I stop believing that 
Clark is an idiot when I am not acquainted with him.  So perhaps the relevant part of §10 
was unclear.  I therefore made a slight change to the fourth paragraph.  This now starts 
with the following two sentences:  
 
Since these persons may include Clark as well as others whom I also think idiotic, 
but I don’t know the identity of the idiot at the Daily Planet to whom Superman is 
referring, I don’t lose my belief that Clark is an idiot when he’s not present.  This 
suggests that I could try addressing him under a domain, as in “I now believe that 
you, one of my colleagues at the Daily Planet, are now an idiot”. 
 
Reviewer #2 
 
My principal misgiving is that there is not enough novel content to warrant its substantial 
length. 
 
Author’s Response 
 
I don’t see how I can respond to the other two reviewers without making the paper a bit 
longer.  I have tried to keep this to a minimum. 
 
Reviewer #3 
 
Comment 1  
 
I don't know that it's uncontroversial to say that assertion distributes over conjunction, 
though the issue often goes unremarked.  If I assert that 2 + 2 = 4 and the cat is on the 
* Response to reviewers' comments
 2
mental attitude, I "in effect" assert simply that 2 + 2 = 4; what I assert entails that, and I 
would presumably be prepared to assert that.  But asserting something is an actual 
performance, and if I don't say something with just that content, I don't actually assert it. 
 
 
Author’s Response 
 
I have inserted a footnote (now #2) on pp. 4-5 of the original MS: 
 
Surely in telling you that today is hot and humid, I both tell you that today is hot 
and tell you that today is humid2 
 
This new note reads: 
 
As a reviewer has pointed out, there is more that could be said about the 
conditions under which assertion distributes over conjunction.  For one thing, a 
conjunctive assertion must surely be an assertion of conjuncts both of which are 
semantically coherent, unlike, say, an attempt to assert that ‘2 plus 2 is 4 and 
green ideas sleep furiously’. In such a case I would not have succeeded in making 
a bona fide assertion since the conjunction as a whole is unintelligible. 
 
Comment 2 
 
I don't think it's felicitous to describe Wittgenstein's point in terms of "my verbal 
supposition or conjecture that I believe that p (for the sake of argument or as a self-report 
of imagination) bears no relation to my verbal supposition that p."  (p. 8)  For 
one thing, 'I suppose' often means simply that I believe, perhaps acknowledging some 
difficulty, but perhaps not.  Also, I don't think that supposition has much to do with 
reporting what I imagine. 
 
Author’s Response 
 
I have inserted a footnote (now #5) that reads 
 
As a reviewer has pointed out, there is another pragmatic sense of ‘suppose’.  If 
you ask me whether it is raining as I peer uncertainly through a semi-opaque 
window, I might reply ‘I suppose so’.  This seems to be roughly equivalent to 
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saying ‘ I believe so’, while acknowledging a lack of confidence in the existence 
of rain. I take this to be a peripheral sense that is not the one I discuss. 
In addition I have rewritten the passage in which this note arises as follows 
 
  Since Wittgenstein identifies use with speaker-meaning, his claim is two-
fold: that that my assertion or self-report that I believe that p is, or involves, my 
assertion that p, but my verbal supposition that I believe that p (for the sake of 
argument) bears no relation to my verbal supposition that p (for the sake of 
argument)5.    
Let us set aside the first claim for the next two paragraphs.  It is now a 
small step to consider Wittgenstein’s remark in the context of non-verbal 
supposition, as a mental act of supposing something true as a means of deduction.  
We would all agree that, in this sense, I might suppose that Britney Spears is now 
President of the USA without believing that she is. Moreover, no failure of 
rationality arises if I suppose that Moore’s omissive or comissive examples are 
true of me, as opposed to believing this.  In other words, no irrationality need 
infect me if I suppose specific instances of my ignorance or mistaken belief to 
exist in order to deduce their consequences. 
   
Comment #3 
It might be that my ability to believe nonabsurdly but not nonabsurdly assert that I'm not 
now asserting anything pertains to the absurdity special to Moore's paradox, but it's not 
obvious to me how.  It would be good to have some more said about that. 
 
Author’s Response 
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I have rewritten the relevant passage to try to make the connection clearer and have also 
rewritten the note that it contains, now #7.  The passage now reads: 
 
Consistently with this last point, Shoemaker (1995, fn 1, 227), observes 
that “What can be coherently believed constrains what can be coherently asserted 
but not conversely”6. But since ‘coherently’ is ambiguous between ‘consistently’, 
‘appropriately’ and ‘rationally’ then the principle best stick with Moore’s own 
term “absurdly”, by which he seems to mean, ‘irrationally, either in theory or 
practice’.  This yields: 
If I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert 
that p, but not conversely  
 
The failure of the converse is supported by the fact that my assertion, “I’m 
asserting nothing now”, is unlike Moore’s example.  For although this would be 
an absurd thing to assert, I could quietly believe in my continuing obedience to a 
Trappist vow of silence without the least absurdity.  By contrast, it would still be 
absurd of me to silently believe either of Moore’s examples7 
 
Note #7 now reads 
So although Rosenthal may be correct in claiming that ‘Moore’s paradox occurs  
with sentences… which are self-defeating in away that prevents one from making 
an assertion with them’ (2002, 167), this claim is too narrow as a definition of 
Moorean absurdity. 
I think this change to the note is fairer to Rosenthal (in the light of the reviewer’s 
comment #5 below, I re-read Rosenthal on Crimmins).  Perhaps incorporating the note 
into the text would make the connection clearer still.  I’d appreciate an opinion on that.  
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Comment #4 
I don't understand what expressing a lack of belief amounts to.(p. 26)  Speech acts 
characteristically express mental states; perhaps my performing a speech act might 
indicate the absence of a belief, but I think it's odd to say on that account that it 
expresses it.  My saying I don't believe something asserts that I don't don't believe it; it 
expresses the belief that I don't believe that thing. 
 
Author’s Response 
I confess that I am unsure how to deal with this.  I’d welcome more guidance.  I agree 
that my bona fide and sincere assertion that I don’t believe that it is raining expresses my 
higher-order belief that I don’t believe that it is raining.  But I think it also expresses my 
lack of belief that it is raining in the sense that ‘making this assertion gives you prima 
facie reason to believe my words’.  On my account this is more than just ‘indicating’ or 
manifesting that lack of belief, because in a bona fide assertion, I deliberately offer you 
that reason.  Against the misgiving I attribute to Green (which the reviewer may or may 
not share), I wrote in the original MS:   
 
Some who write about expression (see Green, Chapter 2) might object that it is 
impossible to express a lack of anything, perhaps because of the facticity of 
expression.  If I can only express what I really have, how can I express something 
that isn’t there?  Surely a woman couldn’t express a lack of milk from her breast.  
But we can see that the facticity of expression is compatible with the possibility of 
expressing a lack of N, once we notice that a lack of N, such as a lack of 
confidence, is something real that I can have within me.  If you ask me if I’m 
interested in going to a party and I shrug my shoulders, I may express indifference 
to your proposal.  My indifference is something real inside me, but an equivalent 
way of describing it is as my lack of interest both in going and in not going to the 
party.     
It might be replied that a state of indifference is an intention state unlike a lack of belief.  
But then again couldn’t a state of agnosticism be an intentional state too?  Another 
thought, borrowed from Aquinas, is that a lack is the absence of a positive perfection.  
This explains why we say that stones can’t see but beggars are blind.  If I don’t have the 
belief that ground is under me, as I walk down the street in normal circumstances, then 
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that would be an imperfection.  So it seems correct to say I lack a belief.  Since I am 
grateful to the reviewer for forcing me to be clearer, I’d be happy to rewrite the passage 
again in the light of further suggestion. 
 
Comment #5 
 
I was surprised that no mention was made of Rosenthal's solution to the Crimmins 
puzzle, which is essentially the same given in section 10. 
 
Author’s Response 
 
I reread Rosenthal 2002 on Crimmins.  I’m glad I did so, because I now see that his 
solution is similar (although I’m not confident that it is essentially the same).  The 
similarity is not effected by the fact that there are other claims made by Rosenthal in 
2002 and elsewhere that I disagree with, in particular that ‘I believe that p’ reports but 
does not express my belief that p.  So I inserted a footnote #16 that reads: 
 
This account is similar to Rosenthal’s (2002).  He observes that ‘one must, at the  
time of assertion, have an occurrent thought with that content’ (2002, 170). So 
Moore’s omissive example ‘… is not assertible because one conjunct denies the 
occurrence at that time of the occurrent intentional state required for the other 
conjunct to perform a genuine illocutionary act’ (2002, 170).  So in asserting that (p 
& I don’t believe that p), I deny that I have the occurrent belief that p, one that I must 
have if my assertion that p is to be bona fide.  Rosenthal would say that the comissive 
assertion is not assertible because one conjunct asserts the occurrence at that time of 
an intentional state ‘manifestly incompatible’ (2002, 170) with that required for the 
other conjunct to perform a genuine illocutionary act.  So in asserting that (p & I 
believe that not-p), I assert that I have the occurrent belief that not-p, one that I cannot 
have if my assertion that p is to be bona fide, unless I hold contradictory occurrent 
beliefs about whether p. 
But when I address Superman by saying ‘You are not an idiot but I believe that 
you are’ the ‘belief the second conjunct … reports is, by contrast, not occurrent at the 
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time of assertion; it is merely something I am disposed to mentally affirm under other 
circumstances’ (2002, 170).  So my reply to Superman roughly means ‘You are not 
an idiot but I am inclined (under other circumstances) to think you are’.  Of an 
omissive variant of my reply, ‘You are not an idiot but I don’t believe you are not’, 
Rosenthal would presumably say that the second conjunct merely reports, at the time 
of assertion, the lack of my disposition to mentally affirm idiocy under other 
circumstances.  So my omissive reply to Superman roughly means ‘You are not an 
idiot but I am not inclined (under other circumstances) to think you are not’. 
 
Comment #6  
Searle and some others have noted that Moore's paradox occurs with illocutionary forces 
other than that of assertion.  Some note might be made of that in connection with the 
discussion of Moore's paradox and desire  
 
Author’s Response 
 
I have added a footnote #14 at the end of section 13.  This reads: 
 
Searle (1983, 9) claims that a ‘generalization of Moore’s paradox’ occurs with  
non-assetoric speech-acts:  
…in the performance of each illocutionary act with a propositional 
content, we express a certain International state with that propositional 
content, and that Intentional state is the sincerity condition of that type of 
speech act. 
Accordingly, Searle’s list of illocutionary acts that violate their sincerity conditions 
constitutes ‘I order you to stop smoking but I don’t want you to stop smoking’, ‘I 
apologize for insulting you, but I am not sorry that I insulted you’, and 
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‘Congratulations on winning the prize, but I am not glad that you won the prize’.  
Also included by his account would be ‘I promise to visit you next Thursday but I 
don’t intend to’.   For dissent however, see Heal 1977.  
 
 
      
G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, “I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I 
don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd.”  Why should it be absurd of me to say 
something about myself that might be true of me?  Moore suggested an answer to this, 
but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore’s 
discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because he saw that it 
illuminates “the logic of assertion”.  Wittgenstein suggests a promising relation of 
assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one “expresses belief ” that is consistent with 
the spirit of Moore’s failed attempt to explain the absurdity.  Wittgenstein also observes 
that “under unusual circumstances”, the sentence, “It’s raining but I don’t believe it’ 
could be given “a clear sense”.  Why does the absurdity disappear from speech in such 
cases?  Wittgenstein further suggests that analogous absurdity may be found in terms of 
desire, rather than belief.   
 In what follows I develop an account of Moorean absurdity that, with the  
 
exception of Wittgenstein’s last suggestion, is broadly consistent with both Moore’s  
 
approach and Wittgenstein’s.   
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Wittgenstein, Moorean absurdity and its disappearance from speech 
 
1. Introduction 
 
G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, “I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I 
don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd” (1942, 543). Over half a century later, the 
nature of such absurdity remains controversial.  On the one hand such sayings seem 
distinct from semantically odd Liar-type sayings such as, “What I’m now saying is not 
true” because what Moore said might be true: you may consistently imagine a situation in 
which Moore went to the pictures last Tuesday but fails to believe that he did.  On the 
other hand it does seem absurd to assert a proposition while, with no apparent change of 
mind, or aside to a different audience, going on to deny that one believes it.  Why should 
it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me?  Moore 
suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly 
impressed by Moore’s discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because 
he saw that it illuminates “the logic of assertion”.  Wittgenstein suggests a promising 
relation of assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one “expresses belief ” that is 
consistent with the spirit of Moore’s failed attempt to explain the absurdity.  Wittgenstein 
also observes that “under unusual circumstances”, the sentence, “It’s raining but I don’t 
believe it’ could be given “a clear sense”.  Why does the absurdity disappear from speech 
in such cases?  Wittgenstein further suggests that analogous absurdity may be found in 
terms of desire, rather than belief.   
 In what follows I develop an account of Moorean absurdity that, with the 
* Manuscript
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exception of Wittgenstein’s last suggestion, is broadly consistent with both Moore’s 
approach and Wittgenstein’s.  My strategy for so doing is as follows. 
In §2 I explain the problem in Moore’s terms.  In §3 I examine the failure of 
Moore’s suggestion for explaining the absurdity. In §4 I sketch Wittgenstein’s own 
response to it.  In §5, I show that the work of both Moore and Wittgenstein helps shows 
the need for five constraints on any satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity, one of 
which is that it should explain why it would be absurd to believe that (I went to the 
pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did).  In §6 I examine a set of examples of 
putatively Moorean absurdities in order to define Moorean belief and in §7 I explain its 
absurdity. In §8 I explain the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of the expression of 
belief and show how this enables an account of assertion.  In §9 I use this account to 
explain the genuine disappearance of absurdity from speech. In §10 I show how the 
appearance of the absurdity in speech is sometimes an illusion.  Finally I show in §11 that 
contrary to Wittgenstein’s suggestion, there is no analogous absurdity in terms of desire. 
 
2. The problem of Moore’s absurdities 
 
Moore did not only observe that to use the sentence 
 “I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did”  
assertively would be “absurd” (1942, 543). He also makes the same point for 
 “I believe that he has gone out, but he has not” (1944, 204).  
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Moore points out that no absurdity arises if I make such assertions in the third person or 
past tense as, ‘xxxx does not think it is raining, yet as a matter of fact it is,’ or ‘I thought 
it was not raining, but as a matter of fact it was’.   
Moore is careful to distinguish absurdity from paradox.  What is absurd is for me 
to assert such sentences. What is paradoxical is this absurdity persists in the absence of 
semantic contradiction in my words themselves (Baldwin 1993, 209) for what I say about 
myself might be true.  So a natural way of resolving the paradox is to explain the source 
of the absurdity, but not in wholly semantic terms. Doing so would locate a contradiction-
like phenomenon while recognising that no contradiction lies in the meaning of what I 
have asserted.  That no contradiction lies in my words is shown by the fact that if I deny 
them by saying, ‘If I went to the pictures last Tuesday then I believe I did’ or ‘If he has 
not gone out then I believe he has not gone out’ then I do not report a necessary truth 
about myself1.  
 
3.  Moore’s account of the absurdities 
 
Moore did not think he had a complete explanation of the absurdity (Baldwin 1993, 211). 
Nonetheless he held that in making a first-person present-tense indicative assertion I 
“imply”, in an everyday or “non-mysterious” sense (1944, 542), that I believe it. Thus 
Moore’s first principle is that  
If I assert that p then I imply that p.  
So when I assert that (p & I don’t believe that p) I assert that p. So I imply that I believe 
that p, which flatly contradicts the second conjunct of my assertion. So what I assert 
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flatly contradicts what I imply by asserting it (Baldwin, 1993, 210). We should note that 
Moore also assumes that assertion distributes over conjunction:   
If I assert that (p & q) then I assert that p and I assert that q.  
This seems unobjectionable however.  Surely in telling you that today is hot and humid, I 
both tell you that today is hot and tell you that today is humid2.   
 Moore’s first example, “I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that 
I did” has the omissive form p & I don’t believe that p, so-called because it self-reports a 
specific lack of true belief.  By contrast, his second example, “I believe that he has gone 
out, but he has not” has the comissive3 form p & I believe that not-p, so-called because it 
self-reports my specific mistake in belief.  This semantic difference is inherited from the 
genuine difference between atheists and agnostics4. This difference is partly obscured by 
the fact that if you ask me “Is it raining?” and I truthfully reply “I don’t believe so”, you 
are usually justified in taking me to believe that it’s not raining, unless I then qualify my 
self-report with “but then I’ve no beliefs about it either way”.  
Moore himself probably did not see this difference.  For he deals with the 
comissive example by using a second principle that  
If I assert that p then I imply that I don’t believe that not-p.   
Since assertion distributes over conjunction, if I assert that p (p & I believe that not-p) 
then I assert that p.  So I imply that I don’t believe that not-p, which flatly contradicts the 
second conjunct of my assertion. So again, what I assert flatly contradicts what I imply 
by asserting it.  But this proposal fails to explain the omissive assertion.  For on the 
second principle, if I assert that (p & I don’t believe that p) then I imply-and-assert that I 
neither believe that not-p nor believe that p, which is neither a flat self-contradiction nor a 
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contradiction in belief, but rather a possible state of sensible agnosticism.   
To repair this problem Moore could either apply the first principle to the  
comissive case as well or apply the first principle to the omissive case and the second to 
the comissive case.  On the first option, I assert that p and so I imply that I believe that p.  
But this does not flatly contradict my assertion that I believe that not-p.  Instead I have 
implied-and-asserted that I have a pair of contradictory beliefs about whether or not p.  
So the two absurdities are conceptually distinct.  On the second option, I have implied-
and-asserted a flat contradiction in either case (that I do and don’t believe that p, in the 
omissive case and that I do and don’t believe that not-p, in the comissive case), so now 
the absurdity comes out as conceptually identical. This means choosing between 
economy of explanandum and economy of explanans.  The first option is best because as 
we just saw, the omissive self-report of specific ignorance is semantically distinct from 
the comissive self-report of specific mistake. So one might expect a semantic difference 
in the contradiction-like phenomena that constitutes the resulting absurdity. 
But this account still faces the problem of elucidating the required “non-mysterious” 
sense of ‘imply’.  Moore claims (1942, 542-3) that his first principle,  
arises from the fact, which we all learn by experience, that in the immense 
majority of cases a man who makes such an assertion does believe or know what 
he asserts: lying, although common enough, is vastly exceptional. 
This statistical claim is plausibly true.  But as Baldwin points out, (1990, 228) this 
“suggests that the absurdity … is comparable to that of a report of a flying pig, and also 
that in the mouth of a known habitual liar paradoxical sentences should not sound at all 
absurd”.   
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We may appreciate the first difficulty by noting that in the immense majority of 
cases in which words pass through lips, the source of those words is an inhabitant of the 
planet Earth.  So in this sense of ‘imply’, the passing of words through lips, for example, 
“The planet Earth is worth saving” implies that their producer is an Earthling.   But 
although it would be surprising to hear someone add, “although I’m not an Earthling”, 
such an utterance is not absurd in the same way as Moore’s examples, because it betrays 
no failure of rationality.  By contrast, my original omissive or comissive speech act of 
assertion seems to constitute grounds for criticism of my rationality, as opposed to the 
mere truth of what I have asserted.   
The second difficulty lies in the fact that if you learn that I’m lying to you when I 
make omissive or comissive Moorean assertions, this knowledge does nothing to expunge 
the absurdity. Nor will any other context of communication expunge it (as Rosenthal 
notes in 1995a, 203).  For example, your knowledge that I’m reminding you, 
misinforming you, confessing to you or announcing to you, does nothing to expunge it 
either.  So insincere Moorean assertions, notably Moorean lies, will have to be explained 
as well. This second difficulty is compounded by Moore’s suggestion (1944, 210-11) that   
a person’s saying certain words assertively tends to make his hearer believe that 
he does believe the proposition expressed … and I think this may be all that’s 
meant by saying his saying so-and-so implies that he believes that so-and-so.  
Given this, my assertion to you that the pubs are open will tend to make you 
believe that they are. But if you persist in disagreeing and I say “You won’t tend to 
believe what I going to say (I know) but I tell you the pubs damn well are open!” then I 
have not contradicted myself.  Indeed all of what I’ve said might be true. But if it is true 
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and I add, “but in fact I don’t believe they are”, or “but in fact I believe they aren’t”, then 
Moorean absurdity appears in a way that cannot be explained by Moore’s own account. 
I now examine how Wittgenstein developed his views on the topic in response to 
Moore.  This will help in formulating further constraints on any satisfactory account of 
Moorean absurdity. 
 
4. Wittgenstein’s response to Moorean absurdity 
 
Malcolm reports Wittgenstein as having “once remarked that the only work of Moore’s 
that greatly impressed him was his discovery of the peculiar kind of nonsense involved in 
such a sentence as ‘It’s raining but I don’t believe it’”  (1984, 56).  
In his letter to Moore the day after Moore’s paper to the Moral Sciences Club 
Wittgenstein notes the importance of Moore’s discovery of an absurdity “which is in fact 
similar to a contradiction, though it isn’t one” and adds that Moore has “said something 
about the logic of assertion” (1974, 177).  So Wittgenstein agrees with Moore that his 
examples are not semantic self-contradictions but sees that Moorean assertion 
nonetheless involves a contradiction in some other way. Wittgenstein’s point is that a 
satisfactory explanation of where the contradiction is located will involve an analysis of 
assertion, in other words its ‘logic’.  Wittgenstein also points out (1974, 177) that 
 It makes sense to say  “Let’s suppose: p is the case and I don’t believe that p is the  
 
 case” whereas it makes no sense to assert “|-p is the case and I don’t believe that p  
  
 is the case”. 
 
Although Wittgenstein probably did not see the difference between the omissive and 
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comissive forms any more clearly than Moore, his insight is that no absurdity arises if 
instead of asserting one of Moore’s propositions, I verbally conjecture that it is true.  This 
gives verbal supposition a role in identifying the absurdity. 
In the Investigations Wittgenstein coins the singular term “Moore’s paradox” 
which he formulates (1953, 190) in terms of supposition rather than in Moore’s terms of 
an absurd assertion of a possible truth: 
 “I believe that this is the case” is used like the assertion “This is the case”; and yet  
the hypothesis that I believe that this is the case is not used like the hypothesis that 
this is the case. 
Since Wittgenstein identifies use with speaker-meaning, his claim is two-fold: that that 
my assertion or self-report that I believe that p is, or involves, my assertion that p, but my 
verbal supposition that I believe that p (for the sake of argument) bears no relation to my 
verbal supposition that p (for the sake of argument)5.    
Let us set aside the first claim for the next two paragraphs.  It is now a small step 
to consider Wittgenstein’s remark in the context of non-verbal supposition, as a mental 
act of supposing something true as a means of deduction.  We would all agree that, in this 
sense, I might suppose that Britney Spears is now President of the USA without believing 
that she is. Moreover, no failure of rationality arises if I suppose that Moore’s omissive or 
comissive examples are true of me, as opposed to believing this.  In other words, no 
irrationality need infect me if I suppose specific instances of my ignorance or mistaken 
belief to exist in order to deduce their consequences.   
Thus Wittgenstein points out that no absurdity arises when Moorean propositions 
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are verbally or mentally supposed either as the antecedent or the consequent of 
conditionals, as in, “If I never hold any true beliefs then I always fail to recognise any 
fact” (Baldwin 1993, 207).  But clearly I would be no less absurd if I believe one of 
Moore’s propositions to be true without asserting it. By contrast, I can quite sensibly 
suppose that I hold such beliefs.  Indeed unlike belief, I can sensibly suppose anything at 
all, even that I am supposing nothing now.  For unlike rational beliefs, useful 
suppositions need not track the truth.  
Consistently with this last point, Shoemaker (1995, fn 1, 227), observes that 
“What can be coherently believed constrains what can be coherently asserted but not 
conversely”6. But since ‘coherently’ is ambiguous between ‘consistently’, ‘appropriately’ 
and ‘rationally’ then the principle best stick with Moore’s own term “absurdly”, by which 
he seems to mean, ‘irrationally, either in theory or practice’.  This yields: 
If I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert that p,  
 
but not conversely.  
 
The failure of the converse is supported by the fact that my assertion, “I’m asserting 
nothing now”, is unlike Moore’s example.  For although this would be an absurd thing to 
assert, I could quietly believe in my continuing obedience to a Trappist vow of silence 
without the least absurdity.  By contrast, it would still be absurd of me to silently believe 
either of Moore’s examples7.  Given Shoemaker’s constraint it seems sensible to first 
give an account of the account of the absurdity of Moorean belief and then account for 
the absurdity of Moorean assertion.  For if the explanation of the absurdity of Moorean 
assertion can be delivered, at minimal explanatory extra cost, in terms of the absurdity of 
Moorean belief, then one seems to get both explanations with best economy.    
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In the first volume of his Remarks on the Foundations of Psychology (1980a, 
§490), Wittgenstein elaborates on his formulation of the paradox: 
The paradox is this: the supposition may be expressed as follows: “Suppose this 
went on inside me and that outside” – but the assertion that this is going on inside 
me asserts this is going on outside me. As suppositions the two propositions about 
the inside and the outside are quite independent, but not as assertions. 
Here Wittgenstein more clearly claims that  
If I assert that I believe that p then I assert that p.   
Wittgenstein holds that both my self-report of belief, “I believe that p” and my plain 
assertion, “p” have roughly similar uses and so, for Wittgenstein, roughly similar 
meanings. Thus Wittgenstein adds, ‘One might also put it like this: “I believe p” means 
roughly the same as “p”’ (1980a,  §472).  His point is that both tell a hearer something 
about my own attitude to the outside world as well as something about the world itself (as 
I take it to be).  Moreover, to decide whether I believe that p all I normally have to do is 
to look to the outside world and decide whether p (1980a, §488, §501).   
On this view of it, the absurdity of Moorean assertion lies in the fact that my 
assertion that I believe that p at least involves my assertion that p. So this strategy of 
getting an absurdity out of my assertion or self-report that I believe that p is quite 
different from Moore’s, which was to get the absurdity out of my assertion that p.  
Wittgenstein’s strategy succeeds in explaining the absurdity of the comissive Moorean 
assertion, for in asserting that (p & I believe that not-p) I assert that I believe that not-p 
and so assert that not-p, which contradicts my assertion that p. So although what I have 
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asserted is not a self-contradiction, nonetheless my assertion of it involves contradictory 
assertions.  
Contemporary followers of Wittgenstein, notably Jane Heal (1994) have 
defended this account, but as I have argued elsewhere (xxxx 1988, §§3-6), there are 
serious difficulties in it.  Firstly the principle that by asserting, “I believe that not-p”, I 
assert that not-p, is challenged by my act of saying, “I think the pub’s not closed, but I 
wouldn’t like to say so, so don’t quote me”.  In support of the principle, Heal points out 
that by saying sincerely “I believe that not-p”, I express my belief that not-p.  Given 
Heal’s assumption that in expressing a belief, I assert what I express, it follows that by 
saying sincerely “I believe that not-p”, I assert that not-p.  But Heal’s assumption is 
challenged by cases in which beliefs are expressed by conversational implicature. By 
answering your question, “Where do her parents live?” with “Somewhere in Thailand”, I 
express my belief that I cannot be more informative than I have been without going 
beyond what I am in a position to assert.  But I do not seem to have asserted this.  
Moreover it is unclear how Heal’s account could deal with insincere Moorean assertions.   
 But the decisive objection is that the account cannot explain the absurdity of the 
omissive Moorean assertion. For in asserting that (p & I don’t believe that p) I assert a 
lack of belief, to which the just-disputed principle cannot apply.  We might attempt to 
repair this problem by supplementing the account with a second principle that if I assert 
that I don’t believe that p then I deny that p.  But then on that principle, an agnostic who 
truthfully reports, “I neither believe that God exists nor believe that he doesn’t” would be 
making contradictory assertions about the existence of God.  Plainly he isn’t.  Likewise, 
my admission of ignorance of your innocence is not an accusation of your guilt.  
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However elsewhere (1980a, §472) Wittgenstein suggests a more promising  
relation of assertion to belief: 
I want to say first of all with the assertion “it’s going to rain” one expresses belief 
in that just as one expresses the wish to have wine with the words “Wine over 
here!” 
This is plausibly read as the claim that  
If I assert that p then I ostensibly express my belief that p. 
Since assertion distributes over conjunction, in asserting that (p & I don’t believe that p), 
I assert that p and so ostensibly express my belief that p.  But I also assert that I don’t 
believe that p.  So I assert-and-ostensibly-express a belief and the lack of it.  In other 
words, I assert-and-ostensibly-express a self-contradiction.  By contrast, in asserting that 
(p & I believe that not-p), I assert-and-ostensibly-express contradictory beliefs about 
whether p.  However the term “express” will need elucidation, a task I will postpone until 
§8.    
Wittgenstein also observes that “under unusual circumstances”, the sentence, ‘It’s 
raining but I don’t believe it’ could be given a clear sense” (1980b, §290).  Indeed he 
gives two consecutive examples of non-absurd uses of omissive sentences.  The first is 
when delighted by the imminent arrival of a friend, I exclaim in amazement, “He’s 
coming but I still can’t believe it” (1980a, §485).  The second is of a railway announcer 
who is convinced that the train won’t arrive.  Under orders, he announces its arrival and 
adds, “Personally I don’t believe it” (1980a, §§ 486-87).  Wittgenstein then gives an 
example of a non-absurd use of a comissive sentence, that of a soldier who produces 
military communiqués but adds that he believes they are incorrect.   
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Wittgenstein’s point is that the appearance of the absurdity in speech is not 
guaranteed by a mere utterance of a sentence of Moore’s omissive or comissive forms, as 
opposed to its assertion.  This is an important point to bear in mind and is one that is 
entirely consistent with the spirit of Moore’s own writings. 
Wittgenstein also supplements Moore’s point that first person present-tense 
conjugations play a crucial role in Moorean assertions.  For Wittgenstein claims (1953, 
190) that if there were a verb meaning, ‘to believe falsely’ then it would not have any 
significant first person present indicative. His point is that first-person present-tense 
assertions such as, “I now mistakenly believe that it’s raining” are not “significant”, in 
the sense that they do not have a semantic content that can be communicated or 
successfully voiced.  
Wittgenstein adds (1953, 190) that it is ‘a most remarkable thing, that the verbs 
“believe”, “wish”, “will” display all the inflexions possessed by “cut”, “chew”, “run”’, 
thus suggesting analogous absurdity may be found in terms of desire, rather than belief. 
   
5. Five constraints on any satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity 
 
We have seen that any satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity must 
 
1) identify a contradiction, or something contradiction-like, but not with the  
 
Moorean proposition itself 
 
 
2) make this identification for both Moorean assertion and Moorean belief (in a  
 
way that recognises that if I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot  
 
non-absurdly assert that p, but not conversely) 
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3) be equally plausible for omissive and comissive forms of the paradox  
 
and 
 
4) explain the role of circumstances which result in the disappearance of the  
 
absurdity from speech. 
 
As we just saw, we are indebted to Moore himself for specifying the first condition, to 
Wittgenstein for suggesting a way to the second, to Moore for his unwitting choice of 
examples as a way of recognising the third (now supplemented by Shoemaker) and to 
Wittgenstein for clearly pointing out the fourth.  The third constraint, of which most early 
commentators (including Moore himself) run afoul, is now more generally recognised.  
Nonetheless it is still common to find accounts of the absurdity in which authors have the 
omissive cases in mind that fail to account for comissive cases or visa versa8.   
 However there is a fifth constraint to be added. For there is a class of assertions that 
intuitively share the paradigmatic absurdity of Moore’s examples.  These include the 
non-conjunctive, “I have no beliefs now”, “Although you think all my opinions mistaken, 
you are always right” as well as the non-first person “God knows that I am not a theist” 
and the comissive “God knows that I am an atheist” (see Sorensen 1988, Chapter1).  On 
the other hand there is a class of absurd assertions that are clearly not Moorean, such as “It’s 
raining and not raining”,  “I am asserting nothing now” and  “It’s raining but I believe that 
it is raining without the least justification” (compare Adler 1999 267-68).  In the middle 
is a third class of borderline candidates for the essential absurdity such as, “All my 
present beliefs are mistaken”.   So a satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity should also 
5) provide a way of identifying further examples of Moorean absurdity 
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6. Defining Moorean beliefs in the light of examples 
 
An obvious strategy for satisfying this last constraint is to compare and contrast 
putatively Moorean beliefs with beliefs in Moore’s own two examples.  Since the first 
constraint prohibits any Moorean belief in a self-contradiction or necessary falsehood, it 
is easy to see that although my belief that it is both raining and not raining would be 
absurd, it would not be absurd in the same way as a belief in Moore’s examples. It would 
be irrational of me to hold such a belief because I should be able to see, with a minimum 
of reflection upon syntax or semantics, that what I believe cannot be true.  By contrast, 
since Moore’s examples report my specific ignorance or mistaken belief, they report no 
irrationality on my part, since my non-omniscience or fallibility is not itself irrational.  
But other cases are not so easily discernible as non-Moorean.  Take my belief that  
 All my present beliefs are mistaken. 
 
This can be read in two ways.  If we read it as 
 
All my present beliefs (excluding this) are mistaken 
then this might be true of me, but then I am not irrational if I believe or assert it.  For it 
might report the fact that I have just learned that I am the victim of systematic delusion. 
Such knowledge might well improve my rationality.  So on this reading it is not 
Moorean.  On the other hand if we read it as 
All my present beliefs (including this) are mistaken 
then it is not a possible truth.  For if it is true then my belief of it is mistaken, so it  
 
is false.  So on no reading is it Moorean. 
 
Since the mere truth of Moore’s examples constitutes no irrationality in me, his 
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examples also differ from my belief that I hold a self-contradictory belief.  For the same 
reason, my belief that  
It’s raining but I believe that it is raining without the least justification   
is not a Moorean belief. By contrast, my belief that 
I have no beliefs now 
intuitively shares the paradigmatic absurdity, despite the fact that it is not a belief in a 
conjunction. Whereas Moore’s examples report specific instances of my ignorance or 
mistaken belief, the content of this belief report my present state of universal ignorance.  
The existence of such a state does not impugn my rationality.  But in so reporting it, it also 
reports my specific ignorance of the truth of that very content, if the moment of reporting is 
the moment at which I assert or believe it.  This explains why quantifying more generally 
over all moments, as in 
I never hold any true beliefs 
would likewise be absurd of me to believe or assert.   
So what is essential to the absurdity of someone believing or asserting a Moorean 
proposition is that such an assertion transparently self-reports that person’s specific 
present instance of ignorance or mistaken belief.  This explains why  
It is raining but xxxx does not believe it is 
is non-Moorean, since it does not transparently self-report a specific instance of my 
ignorance. For it is not absurd of me to believe it if know or even mistakenly believe that 
in fact I am not xxxx.  Nor will you find it an absurd thing for me to assert to you if you 
know that I know or mistakenly believe that I’m not xxxx.  Nor does it seem absurd in 
the same way as Moore’s examples for me to believe that 
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It’s raining but my father’s only son does not believe it 
even if I am my father’s only son.  For this is not an irrational thing for me to believe if I 
know or mistakenly believe that I am my father’s daughter. A further failing of self-
reporting occurs when I am so drunk that I fail to realise that the person I am looking at 
in the mirror is me because I mistakenly believe I am looking through a window. Were I 
to tell you that the person in the glass mistakenly believes that it is raining then I would 
become credible to you in virtue of your knowledge that I foolishly fail to know myself 
under my reflected guise.   
Likewise, as Moore pointed out, no absurdity arises for past tense versions of his 
examples such as 
Yesterday I failed to correctly believe the fact that it was raining 
Nor it is found in future tense versions such as 
Tomorrow I will mistakenly believe that Big Brother is not a fiction 
 
which might sensibly predict the result of my appointment to be brainwashed at the 
Ministry of Love.  A disguised self-report of a specific present instance of ignorance or 
mistaken belief is also found in  
God knows that we are not theists  
despite not being conjugated in the present tense, because the personal pronoun, ‘we’ 
includes a self-report. For in asserting or believing either, I still believe or assert something 
about myself as well.   
 Our examination of the examples so far suggests the following incomplete  
 
definition: 
 
MP’) Any belief is Moorean just in case the content of that belief is a possible 
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 truth that self-reports no irrationality but the belief in it is irrational (in the 
  
 same way as Moore’s examples) 
 
Of course the definition is incomplete since we still must now account for the specific 
way in which it is irrational to believe Moore’s examples.     
 
7. The absurdity of Moorean belief 
 
Neither Moore nor Wittgenstein explicitly consider the absurdity as it arises in belief as 
opposed to assertion.  Nonetheless an account of it can be given that is broadly consistent 
with both Moore and Wittgenstein. 
 All commentators who explain the absurdity of Moorean belief (for example Heal 
1994, 21-2) appeal to the principle that belief distributes over conjunction:   
If I believe that (p & q) then I believe that p and I believe that q.  
Moreover it is hard to see how the absurdity of Moorean belief could be explained 
without it.  Although an appeal to doxastic principles in explaining the absurdity of 
Moorean belief should be generally regarded with suspicion, this principle is an exception.  
For unlike BB-type principles for example, it seems to follow from the very concept of 
belief. If I fail to believe that today is hot or fail to believe that today is humid, surely I 
cannot hold the belief that today is hot and humid.  Since the principle is a definitional 
truth, appealing to it prejudges no question of rationality.    
Now consider Moore’s omissive example.  If I believe that (p & I don’t believe 
that p), then since belief distributes over conjunction, I believe that p.  But then what I 
believe is false, since its second conjunct is false. Although my belief is not a belief in a 
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necessary falsehood it is self-falsifying. Although what I believe might be might be true 
of me and although I might believe it, it cannot be true of me if I believe it.  In other 
words, it is logically impossible for me to truly believe it.  By contrast I can truly believe 
Moore’s comissive example.  For if I believe that (p & I believe that not-p) then since 
belief distributes over conjunction, again I believe that p, which is consistent with the 
second conjunct of what I believe, but only if I hold contradictory beliefs about whether 
p.   
Moreover, discerning this fact, as we just saw, requires a minimum of reflection9. 
So it is not difficult to see that I am severely irrational in the way I theorise and thus why 
my belief is absurd.   
In believing Moore’s omissive proposition I have a self-falsifying belief. In 
believing Moore’s comissive proposition, I escape this irrationality only by the 
irrationality of holding contradictory beliefs. Thus both beliefs are equally absurd 
because these two failures of theoretical rationality are equally severe.  For both types of 
belief are equally useless as guides to the truth. Any evidence that (absurdly) justifies me 
in believing the omissive proposition would justify me in believing what is then false. 
Likewise any evidence for my belief that p is ipso facto evidence against my belief that 
not-p and conversely.  Nonetheless the two irrationalities are distinct, as we should 
expect from the clear difference between an instance of ignorance and an instance of 
mistaken belief.   
The absurdity of other Moorean beliefs can be explained in the same way.  With 
one exception, all these beliefs are self-falsifying. For example, if I now believe that I 
have no beliefs now, then my belief is true only if it is false.  Since my belief is non-
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conjunctive, no appeal is needed to the principle that belief distributes over conjunction. 
Likewise, suppose that I believe that although you think all my opinions mistaken, you are 
always right.  If my belief is true then you would be right to now think that it is mistaken, so 
it is false.  Finally, suppose that I believe that God knows that I am not a theist.  To 
explain the absurdity of my belief we must acknowledge the facticity of knowledge: 
If I know that p then p    
If my belief is true then since God’s knowledge is factive, I do not believe that God 
exists.  But in believing that God knows that I am not a theist, I believe that God exists.  
So my belief cannot be true.   
To see the comissive exception, suppose that I believe that God knows that I am 
an atheist.  If my belief is true then since God’s knowledge is factive, I believe that God 
does not exist.  But in believing that God knows that I am an atheist, I believe that God 
exists.  So my belief escapes self-falsification only if I hold contradictory beliefs about 
whether God exists.  Since I am in position to work this out with a little reflection (as we 
just did) I would be theoretically irrational in continuing to hold such beliefs. 
Now we know the exact way in which it is irrational to believe Moore’s 
examples, we may say that  
 MP) Any belief is Moorean just in case the content of that belief is a possible  
 
  truth that self-reports no irrationality but the belief in it is self-falsifying  
 
  on pain of contradictory beliefs. 
 
One virtue of this definition is that it allows that there is nothing absurd in my belief that  
 At least one of my present beliefs is mistaken 
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because this content fails to self-report a specific instance of mistaken belief.  Asserting 
or believing it would be a perfectly reasonable disclaimer of my infallibility that is has 
most probably been long true of me (See De Almeida 2001, §4). Thus no deep 
contradiction-like flaw in me is revealed.  
Of course, my belief in my own disclaimer guarantees that I have at least one 
false belief. For by reductio ad absurdum, if my belief that I have at least one mistaken 
belief is false then none of my beliefs are mistaken, including my belief in this 
disclaimer. On the one hand this means I have inconsistent beliefs, namely a set of beliefs 
that cannot all be true.  But on the other hand, it also means that my belief in my own 
mistakenness is infallible. Since I was most likely mistaken in some of my many beliefs 
anyway, such a tight grasp of the truth that I am indeed mistaken represents a useful 
heuristic for finding out the truth about which specific mistaken beliefs I hold by looking 
again at the quality of evidence.  
  The lesson to be drawn from this is that Moorean absurdity is not to be analysed 
in terms of inconsistent beliefs but rather in terms of contradictory beliefs. For self-
contradictory or contradictory beliefs are inconsistent but not conversely.  Inconsistency 
in my beliefs does not necessarily undermine my justification in the way my self-
contradictory or contradictory beliefs do. Any evidence for my belief that p is ipso facto 
evidence against my belief that not-p and conversely.  Thus any evidence for the truth of 
my self-contradictory belief that (p & not-p) is evidence for its falsehood.  By contrast, 
evidence for my belief in my occasional mistakenness need not count against any of my 
other beliefs, nor visa versa. I would now have inconsistent beliefs, but not contradictory 
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ones. My correct belief in my occasional mistakenness does not entail beliefs that 
contradict each other, since we may consistently suppose that I don’t believe that all of 
my beliefs are true. So unlike a Moorean belief, one that is self-falsifying on pain of 
contradictory beliefs, my belief that some of my beliefs are mistaken is not Moorean, for 
by contrast, such commitment to the necessity of at least one false belief is benign10. 
 
8. The absurdity of Moorean assertion 
 
Suppose that we elucidate Moore’s ‘non-mysterious’ sense of ‘imply’ as ‘ostensibly 
express’. Then Moore’s first principle that  
If I assert that p then I imply a belief that p  
becomes Wittgenstein’s more promising principle that  
If I assert that p to you then I ostensibly express belief that p to you.   
This move is consistent with the following passage from Moore (1912, 125): 
The truth is that there is an important distinction, which is not always observed, 
between what a man means by a given assertion and what he expresses by it.  
Whenever we make any assertion whatever (unless we do not mean what we say), 
we are always expressing one or of two things–namely, either that we think the 
thing in question to be so or that we know it to be so. 
Let us elucidate ‘express’ as both factive and intentional. It is factive in the sense that I 
express N only if I have N, where N is a noun phrase such as ‘belief’, ‘interest’ or 
‘indifference’.  This usage is of ‘express’ is true to its Latin root, ‘press out’, for a woman 
cannot express milk from her breast unless she has it.  Moreover it conforms to Moore’s 
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usage above.  So if I express a belief that p to you that p then I have the belief that p.  By 
contrast I ostensibly express N to you just in case I represent myself to you as expressing 
my N to you, as when insincerely express interest in seeing your holiday snapshots again 
for the umpteenth time by telling you that I’d love to see them.  Let us also use ‘express’ 
as containing a relevant intention, according to which muttering “Bush is mad” in my 
sleep does not express my belief that Bush is mad, but merely manifests that belief.  I 
manifest N just in case I behave in a way that affords you reason to think I have N.  By 
contrast, I express N just in case I behave in a way that offers you reason to think that I 
have N, in other words, intentionally affords you that reason.  Where N is a belief this 
gives us a definition of expression of belief: 
I express my belief that p to you just in case I believe that p and I behave in a  
 
way that intentionally offers you reason to think that I believe that p   
 
as well as a definition of ostensible expression of belief: 
I ostensibly express my belief that p to you just in case I behave in a  
 
way that intentionally offers you reason to think that I believe that p   
 
As we should expect, all expressions of beliefs are ostensible expressions of belief but 
not conversely. We may now give a definition of assertion in terms of expression of 
belief:  
I assert that p to you just in case I ostensibly express my belief that p to you with  
 
the intention of changing your mind in a relevant way11.   
 
The reference to ostensible expression accommodates lies, which are surely genuine 
assertions.  In lying to you that the pubs are still open I offer you a reason to think that 
they are still open.  The change of mind I intend to bring about is to make you mistakenly 
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believe that the pubs are still open.  The change is relevant in the sense that the 
proposition I assert forms the core of the description of that change.  Likewise in letting 
you know that it is raining I offer you reason to think that it is raining by expressing genuine 
sincerity.  The change of mind I aim for in this case is to impart to you my knowledge that it 
is raining.  
This account of assertion also has the advantage of accommodating non-verbal 
assertions.  Carrying an umbrella only counts as a manifestation of my belief that  
it will rain, since it only affords you reason to think that hold that belief.  By contrast, 
shaking it defiantly in your face when you scoff at my forecast of rain counts as my 
assertion that it will rain, since I have deliberately offered you a reason to think that it 
will rain (namely that I think so myself) with the intention of changing your opinion 
about the weather.   
This means that there can be non-verbal Moorean assertions as well, as when you 
ask me if the pubs are still open and I nod my head in emphatic agreement while saying, 
“I don’t believe so”.  Perhaps Moore has such a case in mind in explicitly distinguishing 
between the uttering of words assertively and making an assertion (Baldwin 1993, 207).   
In what sense do I offer you reason to think that I believe that p in asserting to you 
that p?  A liar attempts to represent himself as a sincere truth-teller.  But if lying were 
known to be the universal norm then this attempt would always fail with the result that 
the practice of lying could never succeed.  A speech act not governed by the norm that 
the speaker believe its content to be true, would not be the speech act of assertion 
(compare Williamson 1996). Thus if you are to make sense of my speech acts then the 
rational thing for you to do is to assume that I am sincere unless observation suggests 
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otherwise.  Thus my speech act of assertion that p gives you prima facie reason to think 
me sincere.  This is broadly consistent with Moore’s failed attempt to elucidate ‘imply’.  
What immediately follows from the account is the principle that my assertion ostensibly 
expresses my belief in it: 
If I assert that p to you then I ostensibly express my belief that p to you12. 
 
Having granted the sincerity of my assertion, you now have some defeasible reason to 
grant its truth.  For granting that I’m sincere in what I tell you grants me the minimal 
authority I need for you to accept my testimony.  Admittedly, there are cases in which I 
make the honest mistake of sincerely telling a falsehood.  There are also cases in which I 
insincerely tell the truth by presenting my lucky guess as an assertion or by getting my 
facts backwards in an attempt to lie.  But given that you are not in a position to suspect 
that this is one of these rare cases, my assertion that p also gives you prima facie reason 
to believe my words by giving you prima facie reason to believe me sincere. This account 
also vindicates Moore’s second principle when ‘imply’ is read as ‘ostensibly express’, 
namely that an assertion ostensibly expresses lack of belief in its falsehood:  
If I assert that p to you then I ostensibly express my lack of belief that not-p to 
you. 
 
For if you are to make sense of my speech acts then you must charitably assume that I do 
not hold contradictory beliefs about whether p.  So once you have granted the sincerity of 
my assertion that p you must also grant that don’t believe in the falsehood of my own 
words, in other words that I’m innocent of a stronger form of insincerity, namely lying. 
Some who write about expression (see Green, Chapter 2) might object that it is 
impossible to express a lack of anything, perhaps because of the facticity of expression.  
If I can only express what I really have, how can I express something that isn’t there?  
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Surely a woman couldn’t express a lack of milk from her breast.  But we can see that the 
facticity of expression is compatible with the possibility of expressing a lack of N, once 
we notice that a lack of N, such as a lack of confidence, is something real that I can have 
within me.  If you ask me if I’m interested in going to a party and I shrug my shoulders, I 
may express indifference to your proposal.  My indifference is something real inside me, 
but an equivalent way of describing it is as my lack of interest both in going and in not 
going to the party.     
It now follows that that there is a more direct way for me to express my belief that 
p to you, namely by asserting to you that I believe that p.  For making this assertion gives 
you a prima facie reason to believe me sincere and so gives you a prima facie reason to 
believe my words.  Thus a third principle drops out of the account, that my self-report of 
belief expresses that belief:  
If I assert that I believe that p to you then I ostensibly express my belief that p to  
 
you. 
  
In accordance with the first principle, in making such an assertion I also ostensibly 
express my higher order belief that I believe that p as well13.   
A fourth principle that my account yields is that self-report of lack of belief 
expresses my lack of belief: 
If I assert that I don’t believe that p to you then I ostensibly express my lack of  
 
belief that p to you. 
 
For making this assertion gives you prima facie reason to believe my words.  
We can now explain the absurdity of Moorean assertion. When I make the 
omissive assertion to you that (p & I don’t believe that p) then I assert that p (since 
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assertion distributes over conjunction) and so by the first principle that my assertion 
ostensibly expresses my belief in it, I ostensibly express a belief that p.  But I also assert 
that I lack that belief.  So by the fourth principle that my self-report of lack of belief 
ostensibly expresses my lack of belief, I ostensibly express that lack of belief that p.  So I 
ostensibly express a belief and the lack of it.  In other words, I ostensibly express a self-
contradiction.  You have no reason to accept my assertion that p since I have told you that 
I am insincere.  Moreover, if you accept what I express then you must think that I do and 
don’t believe that p. 
When I make the comissive assertion to you that (p & I believe that not-p) then I 
assert that p (since assertion distributes over conjunction) and so by the first principle, I 
ostensibly express a belief that p.  But I also assert that I believe that not-p.  So by the 
third principle that my self-report of belief expresses that belief, I ostensibly express my 
belief that not-p.  Thus I ostensibly express contradictory beliefs.  You have no reason to 
accept my assertion that p since I have told you that I am lying.  Moreover, if you accept 
what I express then you must think that I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p.   
In either case I am in a position to see that you will think that I’m making a feeble 
joke rather than adopting contradictory beliefs or ascribing contradictory beliefs to me, I 
should realise that you will not accept my assertion.  So if I persist in my assertion I am 
practically irrational in the sense that I am trying to achieve something I can see won’t 
succeed. 
This account satisfies Shoemaker’s constraint because in either case, what I 
express by making the assertion is identical to what is the case if I truly believe my own 
assertion. 
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Moreover, the account can be easily extended to the other Moorean assertions, 
namely those assertions the belief of which would be Moorean.  For example, if I now 
assert to you that I have no beliefs now, and then by the first principle, I ostensibly 
express my belief that I now have no beliefs.  But by the fourth principle that my self-
report of lack of belief expresses my lack of belief, I ostensibly express that total lack of 
belief.  So I ostensibly express a belief and the total lack of belief.  So what I express is 
self-contradictory.  
 Moreover it also accounts for the absurdity in non-assetoric contexts such as, 
‘What time is it?  But I don’t want to know what time it is’14.  In asking a question under 
the right circumstances I offer you the prima facie reason to think that I want to know the 
answer.  Such circumstances exclude those in we both know that I am checking the 
accuracy of your watch. So I express a desire to know the time, the existence of which is 
contradicted by my second remark. Likewise in issuing a command I express the desire 
that it be executed by offering you the prima facie reason to think that I want it executed.  
Such circumstances exclude those in we both know that I am reluctantly passing on an 
order from above.  Thus in saying, ‘Shut the door!  But I don’t want you to shut it’, I 
express a desire that you shut the door, the existence of which is contradicted by my 
second remark. 
 
9. The disappearance of the absurdity from speech 
 
My account of assertion enables us to explain examples such as Wittgenstein’s in which 
no absurdity appears in my uttering a Moorean sentence to you.  In each case the 
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absurdity is expunged by your background knowledge that I’m not attempting an 
assertion at all.  To see this, it is best to first distinguish between successfully making a 
bona fide assertion and making a successful assertion.  I fail to make a bona fide assertion 
if I utter, ‘The pubs are still open’ but am too drunk to articulate these words intelligibly.  
Nor do I succeed in making a bona fide assertion if I utter these words as an actor in a 
play, since all I attempt is to depict the assertion of a fictional guise.  Having successfully 
made a bona fide assertion, that assertion may succeed or fail depending upon its point, in 
other words what change of mind I intend to bring about in you.  In attempting to inform 
or let you know that p, I intend to get you to know that p.  When I lie to you that p, I 
intend to get you to mistakenly believe that p.    
  One way in which I do not make a bona fide assertion is when you know that I am 
not speaking propria voce.  My articulate utterance, “It’s raining but I don’t believe it” 
under the footlights may depict the absurd assertion of my fictional guise.  But since we 
both know that this is not my assertion, I offer you no reason to think that I believe what I 
say.  Wittgenstein’s last two examples fall into the same category, for our common 
knowledge that I’m parroting the words of the announcement or communiqué means that 
I am not even attempting to make you think I believe them, since we both recognise that 
quoting isn’t asserting either.  Another such case arises when I sarcastically repeat your 
claim that the pubs are closed and add, ‘I don’t think!’  No absurdity arises because we 
both know that I am only quoting your assertion in order to deny it. 
The absurdity may sometimes disappear even when I speak propria voce. 
Obviously no absurdity arises if I utter a Moorean sentence to you as a feeble joke or in 
order to test a microphone since it is clear to you in either case that I am not attempting 
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an assertion. Now consider Wittgenstein’s first example, in which I exclaim to you, “He’s 
coming but I still can’t believe it”.  In order to avoid uncharitably judging me irrational, 
you should not take the second part of my exclamation as the literal truth, but rather as an 
expression of my amazement occasioned by my recognition of a fact that merits yet 
resists belief.  Since we both know that I am not offering you a reason to think I lack the 
belief that he’s coming, I have only asserted the first half of my exclamation. But half an 
assertion isn’t an assertion.  Likewise, once we know that Luis Buñuel’s remark, “I’m 
still an atheist, thank God” was made ironically as he was evicted from Spain for 
attacking Christianity, then his parenthetical addition gives us no reason to think he 
believes in God.  We will take it as a conventional expression of relief that his assertion is 
true rather than an expression of gratitude to God. A final case arises when you ask me 
whether the capital of Thailand is Bangkok or Saigon.  If I am a contestant in your quiz in 
which success is understood to be the mere utterance of the correct answer rather than the 
manifestation of knowledge, no absurdity arises if I answer, “The capital of Thailand is 
Bangkok” and then truthfully add, “but actually I have no beliefs about this either way”.  
My guess is not an assertion because it offers you no reason to think I believe it.  
 
 
10. The illusion of the appearance of the absurdity in speech 
 
There are circumstances in which the appearance of Moorean absurdity in speech is itself 
an illusion. This is the lesson to be learned from Crimmins’ example (1992, as discussed 
by Hájek and Stoljar 2001 and Rosenthal 2002).  This is a case in which Superman 
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informs me that I’m acquainted with him when he is disguised as another person, whom I 
think idiotic.  Since I do not know who this person is, yet accept Superman’s testimony 
on the strength of his reliability and intelligence, I seem compelled to acknowledge my 
acceptance of his news with the reply,  
“I mistakenly believe that you are an idiot”.   
A meta-paradox now surfaces.  Since the logical form of my remark is equivalent to that 
of Moore’s comissive example, it should be absurd. But it does not appear to be so.  
Moreover, in apparent contradiction of Wittgenstein, I seem to have used the first person 
present indicative to make a non-self-defeating assertion.   
But in fact the appearance of absurdity is an illusion that arises from an easily  
made confusion between two readings of my remark, only one of which is absurd.  Since 
I am now attempting to address Superman in order to report my mistaken belief about 
him, it is natural to take my unguarded reply as my assertion that  
“I now mistakenly believe that you, Superman, are now an idiot”. 
Taken this way, the absurdity is more apparent. Moreover the absurdity is genuine.  For 
since it is semantically equivalent to 
“You, Superman, are not now an idiot but I now believe that you are now an 
idiot” 
 
it would be absurd of me to believe it or to assert it to Superman as explained above in §8 
and §9.  Indeed the absurdity of asserting it has an additional source.  Superman would 
not accept the sincerity of such an assertion since he knows that I have just accepted his 
testimony on the strength of his intelligence and so knows that I now believe that he is 
not now an idiot.  Moreover I cannot sensibly attempt make the assertion in order to 
inform him that my words are true. That would involve attempting to impart to him my 
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knowledge that he is now an idiot.  But I do not have this knowledge, since I believe that 
he is not an idiot.  Nor would my assertion fare any better as a lie, since Superman 
himself knows that he is not now an idiot. 
Nonetheless there must be some way in which I can sensibly acknowledge my  
acceptance of Superman’s news.  Finding the appropriate way of doing so is problematic 
because Superman did not let me know the identity of the person with whom I’m 
acquainted and whom I think idiotic.  Had he done so then I wouldn’t have this problem. 
For example, had he informed me that his alter ego is Clark Kent then I would have to 
stop believing that Clark is an idiot.  For otherwise I would have to start believing that 
Superman is an idiot, but we both know that’s not true. In that case I could simply inform 
Superman that I have just changed my mind about Clark. But I can’t do that in this case 
since I don’t know which idiot he has in mind.  This is because I don’t pick out that 
person by the description of Superman’s normal guise, namely “the only person with the 
letter S emblazoned on his leotard”. Nonetheless let us suppose for the sake of argument 
that his alter ego is one of a domain of several persons14, for example, my colleagues at 
the Daily Planet, whom I can pick out by some description, such as “the only mild 
mannered reporter who wears spectacles”.   
Since these persons may include Clark as well as others whom I also think idiotic, 
but I don’t know the identity of the idiot at the Daily Planet to whom Superman is 
referring, I don’t lose my belief that Clark is an idiot when he’s not present.  This 
suggests that I could try addressing him under a domain, as in “I now believe that you, 
one of my colleagues at the Daily Planet, are now an idiot”.  But that won’t work either, 
since I’m now trying to address Superman, not one of those idiots. Nor could I address 
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Superman under the description of his disguise, such as “the only mild mannered reporter 
who wears spectacles” since I don’t know that this description picks out the person I’m 
addressing.   However, we saw in §6 that I may avoid making a Moorean assertion if I 
self-report my specific instance of ignorance or mistaken belief as it arises other than 
now.  So I can sensibly acknowledge my acceptance of Superman’s testimony by now 
replying, 
“I mistakenly believe that you are an idiot whenever I meet you disguised as that  
 
colleague at the Daily Planet”.   
 
No absurdity appears because I am careful not to say that I now hold a belief that is 
mistaken.  Put this way, my reply is akin to “Some of my beliefs are false”, since either 
tells you that not all my beliefs are always true. But as we noted in §6, this is not a 
Moorean assertion.  I escape the Moorean specificity of my self-report of mistaken belief 
because I don’t know when my beliefs are mistaken, since I don’t know when I’m 
acquainted with Superman’s alter ego.  
Since my unguarded reply, “I mistakenly believe that you are an idiot” 
masquerades as the absurd, “I now mistakenly believe that you, Superman, are now an 
idiot” when it is really elliptical for the sensible, “I mistakenly believe that you are an 
idiot whenever I meet you disguised as that colleague at the Daily Planet”, its apparent 
absurdity is an illusion16. 
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11.The absence of analogous absurdity in terms of desire 
 
We are now in a position to examine Wittgenstein’s suggestion that an analogous 
absurdity may be found in terms of desire, rather than belief.  It turns out that there is no 
such analogue, but seeing why this is so tells us something distinctive about desire.  In 
the omissive case the analogue would be exemplified by 
I’m drinking beer now but I don’t want to be drinking it now. 
Unlike Moore’s examples this is not absurd to assert or believe. No absurdity is found 
either in the comissive analogue 
I’m drinking beer now but I want to be not drinking it now. 
I could sincerely and truly report either of these facts when you force me to drink at the 
point of a gun.  Nonetheless there does seem to be something distinctly odd if I now 
desire to bring about these facts or even to wish they would transpire.  Under what 
circumstances would I want to be drinking a beer I don’t want or even positively shun?  
If the oddity were parallel to Moorean absurdity then my omissive desire would be self-
frustrating.  The parallel explanation would require that desire collect over conjunction: 
If I now desire it be the case that (p & q) then I now desire it be the case that p  
 
and I now desire it be the case that q. 
 
So in now desiring it now be the case that (p & I don’t now desire that it be the case that 
p) I would desire it now be the case that p, which would frustrate the fulfillment of my 
higher-order desire.  In other words the fulfillment of my desire to now drink a beer to 
which I’m indifferent would result in a desire for beer that frustrates my desire to be 
indifferent to it.  In the comissive case, now desiring it be the case that (p & I now desire 
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that it be the case that not-p) would be fulfilled only if I now desire that it be the case that 
not-p.  But since I also desire it now be the case that p, I would have contradictory 
desires, only one of which can be fulfilled.  In other words the fulfillment of my desire to 
now drink a beer I want to avoid would result in wanting that beer as well as wanting to 
avoid it.    
This can’t be correct however. Although it would be kinky of me to now want you  
to force me to do something I don’t want to do, we can readily imagine circumstances in 
which pursuing the kinky desire would not be irrational or self-frustrating (we may 
hastily avoid the details).  The reason for this is that desire does not always distribute 
over conjunction.  Surely I can want to drink beer with lemonade without wanting to 
drink beer and without wanting to drink lemonade.  Likewise I may reasonably desire a 
beating I want to avoid, because in so doing, I do not desire a beating, only a beating I 
want to avoid. Indeed if I were to desire a beating, that would spoil all the fun!  If I get 
what I want then my desire to avoid a beating will be frustrated.  But that doesn’t matter 
because the highest order desire is trumps.  In other words, the fulfilment of that desire is 
all that matters.  
Since I can sensibly desire analogues of Moore’s example, desire is more like 
supposition than belief.  A further similarity lies in the fact that as a good Buddhist, I may 
sensibly desire to have no desires.  But desire is still not as laisser-faire as supposition 
since it is still irrational of me to hold self-contradictory desires.  My sincere desire to 
have a series of monogamous affairs with lots of different women at the same time may 
be understandable, but is one it would be practically irrational for me to pursue.  This 
shows a contrast between wanting and wishing.  If I know that a state of affairs will never 
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come to pass, I may sensibly wish that state of affairs were to come to pass but I cannot 
sensibly want to bring it about.  Thus I may sensibly wish I were ten years younger 
although I cannot sensibly want to make myself ten years younger. 
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Notes 
1. In parsing your “Either it is not raining or he believes that it is raining” as “If it is 
raining then he believes that it is raining” I take ‘if’ as implication.  Although 
such an inference is generally invalid, most would allow it here.  For example, 
Stalnaker 1975 and 1984 would allow it on pragmatic grounds since here you 
don’t know which disjunct is true.  If we symbolise ‘I believe that p’ as ‘Bp’ we 
have the following proof: 
1. ~(p & ~Bp)  Suppose the falsehood of Moorean assertion 
2. ~p v ~~Bp  De Morgan’s Law 
3. ~p v Bp  ~~ elim 
  4. p → Bp  → equivalence. 
 
2. As a reviewer has pointed out, there is more that could be said about the 
conditions under which assertion distributes over conjunction.  For one thing, a 
conjunctive assertion must surely be an assertion of conjuncts both of which are 
semantically coherent, unlike, say, an attempt to assert that ‘2 plus 2 is 4 and 
green ideas sleep furiously’. In such a case I would not have succeeded in making 
a bona fide assertion since the conjunction as a whole is unintelligible. 
 
3. Sorensen coins these useful terms in 1988, p.16.  This difference in formalism is 
disguised by Moore’s examples.  This is one reason to think that Moore himself 
did not see the difference.  If we formalise “I went to the pictures last Tuesday but 
I don’t believe that I did” as ‘p & ~Bp’ then “I believe that he has gone out, but he 
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has not” becomes ‘Bp & ~p’. By commutation this yields ‘~p & Bp’.  To achieve 
canonical reference to belief this may be represented as ‘p & B~p’. 
 
4. If a lack of belief that p entailed a belief that not-p then agnosticism would be 
impossible: 
1. ~Bp → B~p    Suppose. 
 2. ~Bp & ~B~p    Suppose agnosticism 
3. ~Bp     2, &-elim 
4. B~p     3, 1. 
5. ~B~p     2, &-elim 
  6. B~p & ~B~p    4,5, &-intro.  Contradiction. 
 And the converse entailment would prohibit contradictory beliefs: 
1. B~p → ~Bp    Suppose. 
2. Bp & B~p    Suppose contradictory beliefs 
3. Bp     2, &-elim 
4. B~p     2, &-elim 
5. ~Bp     4, 1, MP 
 6. Bp & ~Bp    4,5, &-intro.  Contradiction. 
 
5. As a reviewer has pointed out, there is another pragmatic sense of ‘suppose’.  If 
you ask me whether it is raining as I peer uncertainly through a semi-opaque 
window, I might reply ‘I suppose so’.  This seems to be roughly equivalent to 
saying ‘ I believe so’, while acknowledging a lack of confidence in the existence 
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of rain. I take this to be a peripheral sense that is not the one that I discuss.    
 
6.  This constraint is anticipated in Wolgast 1977, p.118. 
 
7.  So although Rosenthal may be correct in claiming that ‘Moore’s paradox occurs  
with sentences… which are self-defeating in away that prevents one from making 
an assertion with them’ (2002, 167), this claim is too narrow as a definition of 
Moorean absurdity. 
 
8.  This constraint on explanation is recognised by xxxx (1979, 1988, §2), De  
Almeida (2001, 30) and Heal (1994, 6).  Hájek and Stoljar’s (2001, 209)  
diagnosis of the absurdity of omissive Moorean assertion — that I express  
contradictory beliefs (because I assert that p and so express a belief that p and also  
assert that I believe that not-p and so express a belief that not-p) — does not apply 
to the comissive assertion. 
 
9. As De Almeida (2001, 42) notes, I need the minimal intelligence to present 
myself with such an argument for the absurdity. But this hardly constitutes an 
objection. 
 
10. Against De Almeida’s objection (2001, 42-3). The tripartite distinction between 
holding a self-contradictory belief, as when I believe that (p and not-p), holding a 
pair of contradictory beliefs, as when I believe that p and I believe that not-p and 
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holding an inconsistent set of beliefs, as when I believe that p and believe that q 
and believe that not-(p and q) is the distinction between believing something that 
contradicts itself, holding a pair of beliefs that contradict each other and holding a 
set of beliefs that cannot all be true.  The distinction is underpinned by the fact 
that belief does not collect over conjunction.  Some commentators (for example 
De Almeida himself, 2001) make the same distinction by describing beliefs as 
‘contradictory’,  ‘strongly inconsistent’ and ‘weakly inconsistent’. 
 
11. Compare xxxx 1996, §7. 
 
12. However Rosenthal (1995a, 203) rejects this approach based on the claim that a  
Moorean assertion is “absurd even in soliloquy, where no betrayal of insincerity is 
relevant; one cannot [coherently] say to oneself ‘It’s raining but I don’t think it 
is’”.   But this is a bad example, since soliloquy is apt to be absurd anyway.  
Unless soliloquy is merely a stage performance, in which case it is just the 
pretence of assertion, isn’t talking to myself a sign of madness? For example if I 
tell myself that p as an attempt to let myself know that p, then the attempt is 
pointless since I already have the knowledge I’m trying to impart.  On my account 
we can explain the absurdity of omissive Moorean soliloquy as my attempt to 
make myself both believe that I believe that it’s raining (in virtue of making 
myself believe I’m insincere) and believe that I don’t believe that it’s raining (in 
virtue of making myself think I’m telling the truth).  The absurdity is now 
revealed as my attempt to make myself irrational.  On the other hand if my 
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soliloquy is merely a stage performance then I have depicted this absurd attempt 
on the part of my fictional guise, although I have not made an assertion myself, 
absurd or otherwise. 
 
13. However Rosenthal (1995a, p.199, compare Hajek and Stoljar 2001) denies this.  
He holds that by asserting that p I express the belief that p, but in reporting that I 
believe that p, I do not express this belief (2002, 168).  Rosenthal assumes that 
since my report of belief, ‘I believe that p’ expresses my higher order belief that I 
believe that p, then it cannot also express my belief that p as well.  For he also 
assumes that if it did, then there would be no difference between reporting a belief 
by ‘I believe that p’ and expressing a belief by ‘p’.  On my account both 
assumptions are false.  For my assertion ‘I believe that p’ both expresses my 
belief that I believe that p and also expresses my belief that p.  But this does not 
mean that there is no difference between reporting a belief by ‘I believe that p’ 
and expressing a belief by ‘p’.  The difference is that in making the plain assertion 
‘p’ I do not express a belief that I believe that p.  
 
14. Searle (1983, 9) claims that a ‘generalization of Moore’s paradox’ occurs with  
non-assetoric speech-acts:  
…in the performance of each illocutionary act with a propositional 
content, we express a certain International state with that propositional 
content, and that Intentional state is the sincerity condition of that type of 
speech act. 
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Accordingly, Searle’s list of illocutionary acts that violate their sincerity 
conditions constitutes ‘I order you to stop smoking but I don’t want you to stop 
smoking’, ‘I apologize for insulting you, but I am not sorry that I insulted you’, 
and ‘Congratulations on winning the prize, but I am not glad that you won the 
prize’.  Also included by his account would be ‘I promise to visit you next 
Thursday but I don’t intend to’.   For dissent however, see Heal 1977. 
 
 
15. Hájek and Stoljar (2001, 209) make this point. 
 
16. This account is similar to Rosenthal’s (2002).  He observes that ‘one must, at the  
time of assertion, have an occurrent thought with that content’ (2002, 170). So 
Moore’s omissive example ‘… is not assertible because one conjunct denies the 
occurrence at that time of the occurrent intentional state required for the other 
conjunct to perform a genuine illocutionary act’ (2002, 170).  So in asserting that 
(p & I don’t believe that p), I deny that I have the occurrent belief that p, one that 
I must have if my assertion that p is to be bona fide.  Rosenthal would say that the 
comissive assertion is not assertible because one conjunct asserts the occurrence 
at that time of an intentional state ‘manifestly incompatible’ (2002, 170) with that 
required for the other conjunct to perform a genuine illocutionary act.  So in 
asserting that (p & I believe that not-p), I assert that I have the occurrent belief 
that not-p, one that I cannot have if my assertion that p is to be bona fide, unless I 
hold contradictory occurrent beliefs about whether p. 
 But when I address Superman by saying ‘You are not an idiot but I believe 
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that you are’ the ‘belief the second conjunct … reports is, by contrast, not 
occurrent at the time of assertion; it is merely something I am disposed to 
mentally affirm under other circumstances’ (2002, 170).  So my reply to 
Superman roughly means ‘You are not an idiot but I am inclined (under other 
circumstances) to think you are’.  Of an omissive variant of my reply, ‘You are 
not an idiot but I don’t believe you are not’, Rosenthal would presumably say that 
the second conjunct merely reports, at the time of assertion, the lack of my 
disposition to mentally affirm idiocy under other circumstances.  So my omissive 
reply to Superman roughly means ‘You are not an idiot but I am not inclined 
(under other circumstances) to think you are not’.     
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